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When, if ever, is it appropriate to turn anti-discrimination law upside down?  When, instead of 
saying that less favourable treatment on grounds such as ethnicity or sexual orientation is 
prohibited, can we say instead that having a such a characteristic is actually a requirement for the 
job?  That is the question we set out to answer in considering the scope of genuine occupational 
requirements. 
It is particularly interesting to consider this question today, since it is only last year that the ECJ 
considered the scope of the genuine occupational requirement exception in relation to Directive 
2000/78 for the first time in an age discrimination case – Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main1.  
Previously, the rather sparse case law on this issue had arisen only in the context of sex 
discrimination, as we will see. 
1  Context and ECJ jurisprudence 
While there can be a defence of justification where an employer imposes a provision, criterion or 
practice which results in indirect discrimination against one of the protected groups, there is no 
defence to direct discrimination2.  Thus, the only circumstances in which an employer is able directly 
to discriminate on one of the protected grounds is either if there is an applicable genuine 
occupational requirement or if the situation falls within the limited circumstances where positive 
action is permitted3.  The genuine occupational requirement concept was originally introduced in 
relation to sex discrimination and, until Wolf, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in relation to this concept 
so far comprised only cases on sex discrimination. This helps to explain why the genuine 
occupational requirement exception was developed: it is easy to think of situations in modelling, 
photography or performing where the sex of the participant would be critical 
The provision in 2000/78 permitting the genuine occupational requirement derogation is in these 
terms: 
Article 4: Occupational requirements 
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(1) Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of 
treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in 
Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried 
out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate.4 
An examination of the legislative history of the genuine occupational requirement concept, informed 
by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, shows that hitherto, there has been increasing emphasis on the idea 
that the exception is to be seen as a highly unusual phenomenon, rarely to be relied upon.  The 
legislation has also recognised that the genuine occupational requirement concept is inherently an 
evolving concept, which is liable to change as social and cultural attitudes change in society.  For 
example, in 1983, in Commission v United Kingdom5 the ECJ accepted that it was legitimate to 
restrict the role of midwife to women only, because of the sensitivity of the relationship between 
the midwife and the woman giving birth.  However, in 2000 the Commission reported that the 
profession of midwife was now fully open to men in all the Member States.6   
Scope of the general genuine occupational requirement  
As noted already, there is one specific genuine occupational requirement in 2000/78 Art 4(2) relating 
to religious organisations.  This will be considered later.  In this section, the general genuine 
occupational requirement is considered in more detail. 
The first point to note is that the genuine occupational requirement provisions are permissive, not 
mandatory.  There is no need for Member States to use this facility at all, as the ECJ stressed in 
Commission v Germany7.  Secondly, the Directives do not say that race, sexual orientation, religion or 
belief, etc must themselves constitute the genuine occupational requirement: rather, the genuine 
occupational requirement need only be a characteristic related to any of the protected grounds, 
which is a wider formulation.  Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main provides an example: the case 
concerned an age restriction for entry into the fire service, based on a need to ensure sufficient 
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firefighters with high physical capacities: this was a characteristic related to age, rather than age 
itself. 
Thirdly, there are two alternative ways in which a requirement may be held to be genuine and 
determining: first, because of the nature of the particular occupational activities, or secondly, 
because of the context in which they are carried out: see Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC8.   
The fourth, and very important point, is that the principle of proportionality must be applied in 
considering the genuine occupational requirement exception.  Again, this point was established in 
case law on Directive 76/207 Art 2(2): see Johnston, Kreil and Sirdar v Army Board and Secretary of 
State for Defence9, for example.  In Johnston, the Court explained the principle in these terms: 
“That principle requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for 
achieving the aim in view and requires the principle of equal treatment to be reconciled as far as possible 
with the requirements of public safety which constitute the decisive factor as regards the context of the 
activity in question.” (para 38). 
While these cases give some flavour of how the principle of proportionality has been applied in 
practice, it may be felt that the particular application in Sirdar is at least ripe for review in the light of 
modern conditions.  In particular, it seems strange that the Court appeared to have accepted that 
women could not perform the required role in the Royal Marines without investigation of whether 
this was in fact the case.  Similarly, in Johnston, some commentators have criticised the Court’s 
willingness to accept that there could be an argument based on public safety restricting the arming 
of women police officers without factual evidence of any such increased danger.  In both cases there 
is an element of gender stereotyping in the underlying attitudes about the capabilities of women 
compared with men.10 
It should be noted that the circumstances in which a genuine occupational requirement can be 
claimed as stated in the Directive have been treated by the Court as exhaustive: that is to say, there 
are no circumstances in which Member States can argue for other special occupational exemptions: 
Johnston, where the argument that the Chief Constable’s actions were justified by considerations of 
national security, protection of public safety and public order were rejected by the Court: 
“… the principle of equal treatment is not subject to any general reservation as regards measures taken on 
the grounds of the protection of public safety …” (para 27) 
Similar findings were made by the ECJ in Sirdar and Kreil.   
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On the other hand, the Court has accepted that Member States have some margin of discretion 
when adopting measures which they consider to be necessary in the interests of public security.  
This was stated in Sirdar11 and is also evident from Dory v Germany12. 
 
The last principle is the requirement that any derogation must be transparent, so that it is capable of 
effective supervision by the Commission.  This was established in Commission v France13. 
2 Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main14  
Wolf is an interesting case for many reasons.  It is the first case on genuine occupational 
requirements under Directive 2000/78/EC.  It is the first to deal with a ground other than sex as an 
occupational requirement, and it is the first case in the ECJ on this area since 2000. 
The claimant applied to become an intermediate firefighter.  He was rejected because the service 
applied an age limit of 30 to recruitment to these posts and Mr Wolf was 31.  The question referred 
to the ECJ by the German court was essentially, whether this was justified under Art.6(1) of Directive 
2000/78.  This is the provision which permits even direct discrimination to be justified where the 
ground is age, unlike the other grounds covered by the Anti-Discrimination Directives. 
All potential recruits had to pass a demanding physical test before they were taken on: however, Mr 
Wolf did not even get this far because he had already been screened out by the age limit.  The 
justification given for the age limit for recruits was the need to create a balanced age structure in the 
fire service in order to ensure its operational capacity and proper functioning.  While the retirement 
age for firefighters is 60, evidence was given that few aged 45-50 were capable of carrying out 
frontline duties and effectively no one aged over 50 did so.   
One of the most striking things about this case is that it was referred to the ECJ only under Art.6(1) 
of Directive 2000/78/EC, i.e. on the question of whether it was justified age discrimination, not 
under the genuine occupational requirement exception under Art.4(1).  The reason for this was that 
the German court thought that, since physical fitness was looked at as a separate part of the 
selection process, the age limit could not be a genuine occupational requirement.  Nonetheless, the 
Advocate General and the Court took up this point of their own motion.  As the Court put it,  
“... it is not the ground on which the difference of treatment is based but a characteristic related 
to that ground which must constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.” 
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Its (relatively brief) reasoning on the issue was as follows: 
First, the objective of ensuring operational capacity and proper functioning of the fire service was 
accepted as legitimate – this was unarguable.  Secondly, the uncontradicted evidence of the German 
Government that some of the tasks of intermediate firefighters required exceptionally high physical 
capacities meant that this could be regarded as a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement.  Thirdly, the evidence showed that possession of these physical capacities was related 
to age.  Fourthly, it was proportionate to impose the age limit, in order to ensure that firefighters 
would have a period of about 15-20 years in which they would be able to carry out the most 
demanding duties. 
Wolf is notable for the fact that neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ made any reference to the 
earlier jurisprudence on genuine occupational requirements.  The tenor of the decision is quite 
different from those earlier cases: there is no emphasis on the exceptional nature of allowing a 
genuine occupational requirement and the discussion of proportionality arguably gives insufficient 
attention to the issue of whether the legitimate aims of operational efficiency could not be met in 
some other, less burdensome manner.  Indeed, it can be argued that in this case, the Court has been 
satisfied with a lower standard of proportionality than is usual, namely, that the employer’s decision 
to impose the age limit was reasonable in the circumstances. 
3 Questions which remain outstanding 
One of the main issues which arises from Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt is the decision implies that there 
may now be different standards of review for genuine occupational requirements under the 
different Directives.  This would go against the tide which has been running towards convergence in 
recent years, but seems to be a possible result.  The case law on genuine occupational requirements 
for the purposes of sex discrimination law is well settled and longstanding and it seems unlikely that 
there will be an alteration in approach on that front.  If, as proposed above, a less stringent standard 
is applied to the other Directives, then divergence would seem to be inevitable. 
On the other hand, a difference in approach to the different grounds might mirror the position in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its approach to the open-ended prohibition 
on discrimination in Art.14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  It is also the case that 
some countries, both within and outside the European Union, differentiate between different 
grounds, some not permitting the concept in relation to some grounds.  In the USA, for example, the 
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equivalent “bona fide occupational qualification” is permitted on grounds of religion, sex or national 
origin, but not on grounds of ethnic origin.15 
Authenticity 
When we consider the various grounds protected by Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78, we may find 
that different considerations come into play for each of them.  An obvious example would be 
authenticity in relation to acting, modelling and other occupations where appearance is important.  
In Commission v Germany the ECJ noted that the laws and practices of Member States were similar 
with regard to exemptions relating to singing, acting, dancing and artistic or fashion modelling.16 But 
this is an example where, although it is easy to imagine sex being an obvious genuine occupational 
requirement, it is not by any means so clear that such occupational activities should come within the 
exception for other grounds.  Authenticity of appearance could constitute a genuine occupational 
requirement on grounds of race: the Commission referred expressly to this in its proposal for 
Directive 2000/4317, although in acting this has not always been the case.18  Authenticity could also 
apply in relation to (apparent) age, but probably not in relation to the other protected grounds.  
Being heterosexual did not disqualify Sean Penn from playing Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man 
to be elected to public office in California, in the 2008 film, Milk.  Indeed, it is possible that the 
knowledge that he was heterosexual was seen as making his success in the role the more 
praiseworthy and may even have contributed to his being nominated for an Oscar.  In similar vein, 
Colin Firth was playing against type when he won a BAFTA award in 2010 for his portrayal of a gay 
man in the film, A Single Man, based on the novel by Christopher Isherwood19.  However, this may 
not work in reverse: it is entirely probable that an openly gay actor may find his or her opportunities 
diminished because they are perceived as not credible in, say, a romantic leading role.  This raises a 
further question: could credibility in an occupational role amount to a genuine occupational 
requirement, either because of the nature of the occupational activities or context in which they are 
carried out? 
I have raised the question in relation to sexual orientation and acting.  The same question could arise 
in relation to employment in organisations promoting the welfare or providing services to people in 
the protected groups.  Could it be a genuine occupational requirement that the chief executive of an 
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organisation promoting the rights of disabled people or gay people should themselves be disabled or 
gay, in order to be credible in the role?   
A related, but different issue arises where services are provided to people within one of the 
protected groups – are those services most effectively provided by people who share the relevant 
characteristics?  In such a case, what would be the characteristics which are genuine and 
determining? Is empathy enough to constitute a genuine occupational requirement?   
Security 
It is noticeable that the cases which have arisen on the applicability of the genuine occupational 
requirement exception have mainly arisen in relation to the police, the armed forces and similar 
occupations.  Directive 2000/78 Art 3(4) permits Member States not to apply the Directive to the 
armed forces in relation to discrimination on grounds of disability and age.   
What level of evidence will a Member State need to produce to show that individuals do not have 
the required capacity?  If, for example, Member States were to be allowed to exempt particular 
occupations under this principle, rather than to produce proof this on a case-by-case basis for each 
particular post and each particular individual, there is a danger of stereoptyped assumptions about 
the capabilities of people with disabilities, or older people, being used in a negative fashion to limit 
opportunities20.  It appears from Wolf that particular posts rather than whole occupations may be 
exempted, but not on a case-by-case basis.  The interplay with the duty of reasonable 
accommodation is also important in relation to disability.  Where members of the armed forces, for 
example, are injured on active service, it may be felt that the armed forces should have a particular 
duty to attempt to accommodate them (and make use of their valuable training and experience) in 
suitable non-combat roles rather than to dismiss them as no longer having the required capacity to 
perform the range of functions a soldier may be called upon to perform.  
Privacy 
The privacy argument is important more generally.  Hazel Oliver points out that there is a 
fundamental conflict between privacy and the genuine occupational requirement based on sexual 
orientation.21  Since the Directive prohibits discrimination on grounds “related to” sexual 
orientation, it follows that a claim may be pursued where an individual has been discriminated 
against because an employer thinks that he or she is gay, regardless of whether or not this is in fact 
the case.  Indeed, there is no need for claimants to disclose at any point what their sexual 
orientation is – thus they can maintain their privacy.  But if sexual orientation is said to be a genuine 
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occupational requirement, it follows that anyone applying for such a post must also disclose their 
sexual orientation – which infringes their rights to privacy.  The same sort of conflict also arises in 
relation to a genuine occupational requirement based on religion or belief and (perhaps) age and 
disability. 
Access to employment 
Another major difference between genuine occupational requirements based on sex and those 
based on the other protected grounds is that in relation to sex, a genuine occupational requirement 
can only be relied upon in relation to access to employment, or training for it, while under Directives 
2000/43 and 2000/78 any difference in treatment may be a genuine occupational requirement.  Is 
there any warrant for this?   
Conclusions 
The genuine occupational requirement exceptions permitted under Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 
are intended to be limited in scope and to be interpreted strictly.  However, the recent decision of 
the ECJ in Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main22 at least raises the question whether the same standard 
of strictness which has hitherto applied in sex discrimination cases will apply equally to genuine 
occupational requirements under the newer Directives.  It is clear that there are a number of areas 
where it is not clear how far the exceptions will operate and it is not always possible to extrapolate 
principles from existing case law on sex equality in relation to the other protected grounds.  The 
inconsistency between protection under Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 and Directive 76/207 (and 
2006/54), with the latter being restricted to access to employment while the others are at large, is at 
best puzzling, at worst a worrying anomaly.  What is clearly of great importance is that the genuine 
occupational requirements should be kept under review and that we should constantly ask the 
question, are they really necessary? 
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